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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CAROL EWAN,
Plaintiff-.,1 p pe llant,

vs.

Case No.
10086

RAY BUTTERS,
Defendant-Respondent.

PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the
District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Ray VanCott, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and property
damage arising out of a collision between the plaintiff
who was a pedestrian and the defendant who was driving
his automobile.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried with a jury. At the close
first day of trial, it was agreed what the testimony
be from OTIJe additional witness. Thereupon, the
granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and from
the plaintiff appeals.

of the
would
Court
which

RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks reversal of the Dismissal, and that
the case be remanded for trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Carol Ewan, is employed by West Coast
Air Lines as a passenger agent (T. 25, L. 17-19) and has
been for approximately five years (T. 26, L. 15), and prior
to January, 1964, had lived in Salt Lake a little over 31h
years (T. 26, L. 24). She is divorced (T. 27, L. 23), and has a
15 year old son (T. 27, L. 10), and in order to support her
son she had a part time job after her working hours, employed by the Relaxercizor Company (T. 27, L. 26). It was
the plaintiff's practice that when a person made inquiry
about a Relaxercizor that the plaintiff would call them on
the telephone, make an appointment if the inquiring per·
son wanted to see the machine, and would go and demonstrate it to them (T. 28, L. 26-30). On the evening of
November 21, 1962, the plaintiff had an appointment with
a Mrs. Trudy Turn:er who lived on Duluth Street in Salt
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Lake City (T. 29, L. 6 & 7). The plaintiff did not know
"·here Duluth was and Mrs. Turner gave her directions to
take Second West to Beck Street (T. 29, L. 8). As a matter
of fact, Second West ends at a curve and the continuation
of the same street becomes known as Beck Street. This,
hn\vever, was unknown to the plaintiff (T. 29, L. 9-11). The
plaintiff left her home at approximately 6:30 or 6:45 (T.
2n, L. 23) to keep this appointment, and drove north on
Second West Street (T. 30, L. 4-7). As she proceeded north
nn Second West Street she saw a sign across the street on
the west hand side reading Beck Street (T. 30, L. 9-11),
which was slightly turned, and plaintiff mistakenly
thought that Beck Street went to the west off Second West.
She proceeded on north past the Mars Service Station
which is located on the east side of Second West or Beck
Street, turned around and came back and turned at the
sign she had seen, or to the west, into what she thought
was Beck Street and found it was not a street at all and
her automobile became stuck in the mud (T. 30, L. 15-30).
The plaintiff walked east to Beck Street, to point "D,"
then North on Beck Street to Point "E" as shown on
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, a general reproduction of which is
found in the back of this brief and is marked Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1, along the west side of Beck Street until she was
directly across from the driveway leading into the Mars
Service Station (T. 30, L. 22-30). At the time a portion of
Second West and a portion of Beck Street were under
construction, but that portion of Beck Street shown in
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, had received the first coat of black
top (T. 19, L. 3-13). As is shown on the plat in the back
of this brief and marked "PLAT" which is an enlargement
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of a portion of Exhibit 1, encompassing the crossing and
impact area, at the point of the accident and both to the
north and the south there is a six lane highway, three lan'es
for north bound traffic, three lanes for south bound traffic,
\Vith a painted island in the center (T. 60, L. 18-29); the so
called "island" was not raised, but was outlined with paint.
The nearest crosswalk was one south of Wall Street and
Beck Street intersection (T. 17, L. 14-23). There were no
cross walks north to Covey's Service Station which is north
of Victory Road and Beck Street intersection (T. 17, L.
27-29). Victory Road and Wall Street intersection is shown
on the map, plaintiff's Exhibit 1, which embraces a distance of 3000 feet.

The plaintiff was standing at Point "E" which is directly across the street from point "A" as shown on Exhibit
1, point "A" being the middle of the south driveway of
the Mars Service Station (T. 35, L. 10-23). Plaintiff had
looked to the north for traffic from the Ogden area and
there wasn't any traffic. South of the plaintiff by the swimming pool there were two pairs of car lights which the
plaintiff saw and they were going at a slow speed. (T. 31,
L. 13-17). The north corner of the area of the swimming
pool is marked as point "C" on Exhibit 1 (T. 23, L.20-25).
It is 1290 feet from point "A," the point directly across the
street from where plaintiff was standing, to point "C," the
cars, headlights being farther away than point "C." (T. 24,
L. 16-17). The speed of the two cars just south of point
"C," a distance in excess of 1290 feet from the plaintiff was
20 mph (T. 33, L. 29). There were construction zone speed
limit signs posted setting the speed at 25 mph (T. 15, L.
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4-8, L. 20-30; T. 16, L. 2-24; T. 19, L. 23-28; T. 34, L. 12-16;
T. 55, L. 3-5). In her testimony plaintiff further stated
that these cars were almost two blocks away (T. 32, L. 23),
and the attorney for the defendant stipulated Salt Lake
City blocks are 660 feet long (T. 34, L. 4-11). After checking the traffic and determining that there was no traffic
to the north toward Ogden and that there were only the
two cars at point "C," two blocks away to the south, the
plaintiff started to cross the street (T. 35, L. 2-9). The
plaintiff had decided there was no problem, no danger to
herself (T. 35, L. 27-30; T. 61, L. 10).

The next thing plaintiff remembered was that she was
lying in the middle of the street with somebody holding
her head (T. 35, L. 30; T. 36, L. 1) asking who her doctor
was. Plaintiff could not remember the name of her doctor
and gave them the name of her dentist and upon being told
she didn't need a dentist she said to her questioner to call
West Coast Air Lines and she remembered nothing further
until she was in the emergency room (T. 36, L. 18-24). The
plaintiff had been hit by a car driven by the defendant
Butters who, in the emergency room in the hospital, admitted he had hit her (T. 36, L. 25-30; T. 37, L. 2-9). Again,
several days later in plaintiff's room at the hospital the
defendant Butters, who plaintiff did not remember seeing
in the emergency room, admitted he had hit her (T. 37, L.
11-30; T. 38, L. 3-11). In this conversation in plaintiff's hospital room the defendant stated to the plaintiff, with relation as to where plaintiff was on the street at the time he
hit her that "two more steps and she would have been
on the curb." (T. 38, L. 18-22).
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Witness Jewell was present both times defendant Butters appeared at the hospital, and testified that Butters said
"two or three more steps and she would have been off the
road" (T. 99, L. 16-17). Defendant Butters never saw the
plaintiff until her body hit his windshield (T. 38, L. 15-16).
Plaintiff does not remember the impact (T. 62, L. 11);
she does not remember looking to the north again as she
v\ras crossing the street (T. 61, L. 22-24; T. 62, L. 4 & 5), and
has no recollection of not looking again to the south (T.
62, L. 6-8). Plaintiff could not explain why her recollection
was not good in connection with her looking (T. 63, L. 4-7).
The last time plaintiff can swear she had looked to the
south is when she was on the west side of the road. She
may have looked afterwards; she may not have (T. 65, L.
4-8). She cannot recall whether she did or did not look
(T. 65, L. 13-19). Plaintiff was almost across the street and
it was a shock to her to wake up and find that she was
any place but across the street (T. 36, L. 6-7).
Prior to the accident the plaintiff was in very good
health (T. 57, L. 8-10). She received very serious injuries in
the accident (T. 38, L. 26-30; T. 39, L. 2-9, L. 14-23; T. 71,
L. 3-4; T. 72, L. 2-21, L. 25-26).
In talking with her doctor the plaintiff was unable to
recall the actual event of the accident (T. 73, L. 9-13). The
lapse of memory may continue for a long period of time,
but usually does not (T. 74, L. 9-15).
At the conclusion of the first day's trial and after the
Court had recessed and excused the jury until "10:00
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o'clock tomorrow morning" (T. 100, L. 3-4), there was a

discussion between counsel and Court in the Court's chambers, in which defendant's counsel stated that he understood that plaintiff's counsel intended to produce a witness who, based upon certain physical evidence or other
evidence, would testify that the speed of the defendant's
automobile at the time of impast was 45 mph, to which
plaintiff's counsel replied that this was true and this was
all of plaintiff's evidence (T. 100, L. 9-19).

Based upon this, defendant's counsel moved "that the
Court dismiss the plaintiff's cause of action on the grounds
that the plaintiff's own evidence shows her to be guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and that her
own contributory negligence, failing to keep track of the
defendant's automobile, which she admits she saw prior to
the time of her crossing the street, was a proximate cause
of her OWll! injury and damage" (T. 100, L. 20-27). Defendant's counsel stated there was only one question, "Did she
have the duty to look again and it is clear in this case she
didn't look" (T. 101, L. 5-7), to which the Court replied,
''\\"ell, I think so, and the duty to look again is answered
in this case down here at 33rd South and Second West. I
Just do not see how you can avoid the consequences of
this" (T. 101, L. 8-11), and in granting the motion the
Court stated, " ... this motion is purely upon the contributory negligence of the plaintiff as a matter of law." ...
"The motion will be granted" (T. 101, L. 18-21).
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POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL
1. That the evidence does not support the Court's conclusion that all reasonable minds must agree that plaintiff
\Vas contributorily negligent.
2. That the evidences does not support the conclusion
of the Court that all reasonable minds must agree that the
plaintiff' contributory negligence was a proximate cause of
the collision.

ARGUMENT
Although there are two points of Appeal, the evidence
and general law tend to apply to both, and for convenience
and to avoid repetition they will not be set out in separate
argument.
The evidence and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Cox v. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254
P. 2 d 1047, Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P. 2d, 495,
and Langlois v. Rees, 10 Utah 2d 272, 274, 351 P.2d. 638.
The plaintiff was not in the crosswalk, either one that
was painted or one designated by section 41-6-8 (b) U.C.A.,
1953. As is shown on plaintiff's exhibit 1, there is one and
perhaps more T intersections. However, in the absence
of a marked crosswalk, there is no crosswalk created by
the Statute as is clearly set out in the Langlois v. Rees
case, supra.
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As is set forth in the record, the Ordinances of Salt
Lake City provide that a pedestrian may not cross other
than in a crosswalk unless there is no crosswalk within
700 feet of desired point of crossing, and in such event the
pedestrian may cross a highway by the shortest straight
route to the opposite curb after exercising due care and
<'aution and yielding to all vehicular traffic. The nearest
crosswalk from the point which the plaintiff crossed the
street is far in excess of 1200 feet.

Viewing the evidence in its most favorable light to
the plaintiff, the point of impact was 4 to 5 feet west of
the curb line at the Mars Service Station on the east side
of Beck Street and which point is marked "I" on the Plat.
The plaintiff, a woman, was in high heels and walking
and was within 2 steps of the curb or driveway, and would
be taking steps of approximately 2 feet per step. She had
traveled east almost 100 feet, having crossed 3 lanes of
southbound traffic, a painted island, 2 traffic lanes and almost the third traffic lane for north bound traffic on the
east side. As is shown on the Plat, the outside lane is a pproximately 22 feet wide, almost double the size of the
middle lone or the inside lane. The defendant had approximately 40 feet of unused highway to his left, including 18
feet within his own lane of traffic, but he chose to skim
along the edge of the road, next to the gutter on that portion which is not normally used particularly, while travelling at 45 miles per hour, or he changed lanes or his prior
position in the outside lanP which was almost double the
average size, perhaps for the purpose of turning into the
~Jars Gas Station. In either event, the defendant n·ever
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saw plaintiff until her body hit his windshielf. In view of
the distance travelled by the plaintiff whether it be total
distance or even the distance of approximately 40 feet
over the north bound traffic lan'e and her nearness to the
curb line or driveway, it cannot be concluded that the
plaintiff, as a matter of law, is guilty of contributory negligence, and further that her contributory negligence, assuming the same, was a proximate cause of the accident.
Quite to the contrary, reasonable men could differ upon
the interpretation of the facts herein, and a jury might
well find that the defendant's automobile was not "so
near as to constitute an immediate hazard" and that the
plaintiff did use the ordinary care that a reasonably prudent person, in a like position would have used in keeping
with Section 20.8 of JURY INSTRUCTION FORMS FOR
UTAH, citing Section 41-6-78, U.C.A. 1953, and Sant v.
Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206 P.2d 719. Conceding for the sake
of argument that this Court upholds the lower Court in
holding that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, it does not follow automatically that her negligence
was a proximate cause of the accident. Reasonable minds
might differ and a jury might well find from the facts of
this case and the presumptions hereinafter set forth that
the assummed negligence of the plaintiff was not a proximate cause.

It would appear from the statements made by the
Court in granting defendant's motion to dismiss that the
Court agreed with the statement made by defense
counsel:
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"MR. HANSON: The only question is-did she have
the duty to look again, and it is clear in this case that she
didn't look."

"THE COURT: Well, I think so, and the duty to look
again is answered in this case down here at 33rd South
and Second West. I just don't see how you can avoid the
consequences of this. I guess there is no reason not to
,rrant it now and call the jury." (T. 101, L. 5-12).
~

We submit that the record does not bear out the statement of defendant's counsel when he says, "it is clear in
this case that she didn't look." The record uncontradictorily reveals that when plaintiff was on the west side of
Second Avenue West or Beck Street directly across the
street from the entrance to the Mars Service Station sh~
looked north to see if traffic was coming from Ogden, as
\veil as south (T. 31, L. 9-17; T. 35, L. 2-24; T. 59, L. 5-16;
T. 63. L. 23-24). There was no traffic coming from the
north and two cars coming from the south and these two
cars were approximately two blocks away going at a speed
of 20 mph (T. 32, L. 22-30). The record shows that it was
over 1290 feet from plaintiff's position to the point where
the cars were (T. 24, L. 16-17). Plaintiff decided there was
no problem at all, there was no danger to herself (T. 35,
L. 29-20), and started to cross the street. The last thing
plaintiff remembers is she was just plain walking (T. 61,
L. 10) and then the next thing she remembers was that
she was in the middle of the street with someoody holding
her head and asking who her doctor was (T. 35, L. 30; T.
36, L. 2, L. 19-20). Plaintiff could not even remember the
name of her doctor (T. 36, L. 20-21).
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Both on direct and on cross-examination plaintiff testified repeatedly that she could not remember anything
after she had started to cross the street, or what she did
or did not do after she left the west side of the street (T.
61, L. 16-17, L. 24; T. 62, L. 4-5; L. 8, L. 11, L. 29-30; T.
63, L. 2-7, L. 16, L. 23-26; T. 65, L. 4-8, L. 16-19; T. 92, L.
12). The plaintiff was struck by the defendant (T. 37, L.
8-10), but has no recollection whatever of the impact (T.
62, L. 11). When Dr. Morrow talked with the plaintiff she
was unable to remember the actual event of the accident
(T. 73, L. 9-13). The plaintiff received very severe and
substantial injuries (T. 38, L. 26-30; T. 39, L. 2-9, L. 14-23;
T. 71, L. 3-4; T. 72, L. 2-21, L. 25-26).
It is abundantly clear and absolutely uncontradicted
that the plaintiff has no recollection of what she did and
as to whether or not she looked again to see where the
cars to her south were after she left the west sides of the
highway. Plaintiff's contention is that she had a lapse of
memory. This is supported by the testimony of Dr. Morrow.
In fact, Dr. Morrow testified that this lapse of memory
pOJJad 8UOI B JOJ anur~uoo .Aew JO lSJXa ueJ
L. 9-15). Dr. Morrow's testimony, we believe, is clear that
because of the severe nature of the injuries there can be
a lapse of time when the plaintiff will not remember what
she did or what happened. Therefore, we must accept the
plaintiff's testimony that she could not remember and conclude that she did suffer a lapse of memory for a matter
of seconds immediately prior to the accident.

't L

.J.,) awr~

JO

A lapse of memory during which the events that took
place still cannot be recalled to her mind is a question of
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fact for the triers of the facts, it is a jury question. Napoli
t. Hunt. 297 P.2d 653; Kumlauskes v. Cozzi, Cal., 343 P.2d
6Df>: Schalow v. Oakley, Wash., 139, P2d 296. Since this is
n jury question, the Court was not permitted to conclude
as a matter of law that the testimony of the plaintiff was
not true, but on the other hand, the Court must accept that
testimony as being true. Since we must then accept this
testimony as being true, we must then proceed with the
law and the presumptions that are raised by the law. We
respectfully submit to this Court that logically there is
utterly no difference in the following hypothetical statetnent: A person is involved in an accident and is killed.
The law presumes that person exercised due care and
caution, the presumption being based upon the instinct of
self-preservation and arises in the absence of other witnesses or evidence. A person crosses a highway, is struck
by a car and has no recollection! of the events between the
time they started to cross the highway and when they were
struck. For all intents and purposes as to what happened
in that short interval, that person may as well have been
dead. The law of self-preservation is a law exercised by
c. living person and it makes no difference whether the
person was killed or severely injured in the subsequent
mishap, the law is just as strong. It is completely illogical
that a person would walk into the path of a rapidly moving
automobile anticipating that they would only be injured,
not killed, and that they would lose their memory. We,
therefore, submit there is no logical reason why the pre-
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sumption which arises when a person is killed does not
also arise when a person's memory fails.
VIe respectfully submit that the presumption does
arise and that the plaintiff is afforded all the benefits based
on the instinct of self-preservation that a deceased or a
person from a loss of memory as in this case, was. exercising due care for her own safety and which may take the
place of evidence sufficient to make for positive findings in
favor of the plaintiff in absence of the preponderance of
the evidence to the contrary. Compton v. Ogden Union Ry.
and Dep. Co., 120 Utah 453, 235 P.2d515, Mecham v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 29, 262 Pac. 2d 285, Tuttle v. P.I.E. 121 Utah
420, 242 Pac., 2d 764. The mere fact that the plaintiff was
hit in the highway in no way rebuts that presumption.
That presumption can only be rebutted by the preponderance of the evidence to the contrary. The foregoing is recognized in Section 16.8 of JURY INSTRUCTION FORMS
F'OR UTAH.
Therefore, plaintiff contends that when she left the
west side of the highway she had ample time to safely
cr.oss the highway prior to the arrival of the car being
driven by the defendant, which car was at least 1290 feet
away when first observed, drivin1g at an estimated speed
of 20 miles per hour. The plaintiff had an absolute right to
rely upon the fact that the defendant would comply with
the posted speed limit which was 25 miles per hour (T.
15, L. 4-8, L. 20-30; T. 16 L. 2-24), and that the defendant
-vvould not speed up or otherwise recklessly drive into the
plaintiff. Section 41-6-79(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Fox v. Taylor 10 Utah 2d, 174, 350 Pac. 2d, 154.
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Since the duty and care imposed upon the plaintiff is
to look and continue to look in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, it is presumed that the plaintiff discharged
that duty . .Nlingos vs. Olson, supra. We further submit that
the factual situation in this case as afforded by this record
as to the events after the plaintiff left the west side of the
highway and up to the time of impact, is almost a perfect
example to apply the reasoning of the Honorable Justice
\Varle in the case of Mingus vs. Olsson, supra:
"If there were a complete absence of evidence as
to whether he took any precautions to avoid the
accident, then the law creates a presumption that
he took reasonable precautions for his own safety
and that he was injured in spite of such pretions.''

In upholding the defendant's Motion the Court had to
find, from the facts, that reasonable men could draw but
one inference and that inference would point unerringly
(emphasis is added) to the plaintiff's negligence which contributed to her inqury. Cox v. Thompson, 123 Utah 2d 272,
254 P.2d 1047. It is clear from the evidence that there is
n1ore than one inference that can be drawn from facts and
such inferences would not point unerringly to the plaintiff's negligence which contributed to her injury. It was
agreed that defendant's automobile was travelling 45 miles
per hour at the time of the impact. (T. 100 L. 11-16). The
only way, as we see it, that this inference could not be
construed to be beneficial to the plaintiff, and even then
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it is doubtful whether such construction would not be
beneficial to the plaintiff, is by assuming that there was a
gradual increase of speed by the defendant over a distance
in excess of 1290 feet. The Court is not at liberty to construe this inference against the plaintiff, but to the contrary must construe in favor of the plaintiff. Therefore, the
con1struction must be that the defendant's increase of speed
must have been sudden and immediate before the impact.
The plaintiff having once entered the street was entitled
to rely upon the fact that the defendant would not suddenly increase his seed in violation of the Statute, and further
the plaintiff was entitled to the presumption that a person
who is exercising due care has a right to rely and assume
that others will also perform their duties under the law,
i.e. that the defendant would not speed up, and that the
defendant would not exceed the speed limit. Ferguson v.
R.eynolds, 52 Utah 583, 176 Pac. 267.
We not only strongly disagree with counsel for defendant's statement when he stated, " ... did she have the
duty to look again and it is clear in this case that she didn't
look," but we contend that every shred of the evidence contained in this record where there is positive testimony as
to what happened is that the plaintiff was without negligence. Plaintiff was not trying to beat them across the
Street (T. 59, L. 19). Having looked, determined defendant's distance, defendant's rate of travel, plaintiff concluded that she was absolutely safe instartingacrossthatstreet.
Not remembering whether or not she looked after leaving
the west side of the street, having been rendered unconscious, the plaintiff is entitled to the presumption of the
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law. that she did look, that she discharged the duty of
tTa~onable care and the further presumption that she was
injured in spite of such precautions.

We believe that the lower Court was relying on Smith
vs. Bennett, 1 Utah 2d 224, 265 P.2d 401. The facts in that
case are far different and easily distinguishable from the
facts of this case. There the pedestrian left a marked crosswalk in the middle of the road, walked up the middle of
the street, and there was evidence that she suddenly ran'
from a place of safety in front of the defendant's automobile. She rather obviously had mislead the defendant
by turning her back to him and moving away from him
in a safety zone. None of these facts are presenrt in the case
before you. The Smith case is in keeping with the Langlois case; in each case there was an available marked cross\valk.
There was neither a marked crosswalk nor an unmarked crosswalk anywhere near the vicinity for Mrs.
Evans to use.
CONCLUSIONS
We respectfully submit that the lower Court erred iDJ
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and that judgment
should be reversed and the cast remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
BELL&BELL
by J. RICHARD BELL,
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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